This paper uses a Bayesian mechanism design approach to investigate the effect communication in a threshold public goods game, where individuals have private information about contribution costs. If at least some fraction of the group make a discrete contribution, a public benefit accrues to all members of the group. We experimentally implement three different communication structures prior to the decision move: (a) simultaneous exchange of binary messages, (b) larger finite numerical message space and (c) unrestricted text chat. We obtain theoretical bounds on the efficiency gains that are obtainable under these different communication structures. In an experiment with three person groups and a threshold of two, we observe significant efficiency gains only with the richest of these communication structures, where participants engage in unrestricted text chatting. In that case, the efficiency bounds implied by mechanism design theory are not only achieved, but with experience are actually surpassed. JEL Classification Numbers: C72, C92, D82, D83, H41
Introduction
We investigate how communication influences public good provision in a threshold public goods game with private information about contribution costs. The provision of threshold public goods combines free riding incentives with a coordination problem, both of which are further complicated if there is private information. Pre-play communication between agents provides a potential path to overcoming these problems, but the how effective such communication by itself can be, and how its effectiveness may depend on the structure of communication and private information, are questions that remain largely unanswered both theoretically or empirically. This paper makes three contributions to addressing these questions. First, by modeling the game with communication as a Bayesian mechanism design problem, we are able develop some theoretical bounds on the gains that can be attained from different pre-play communication protocols. Second, we show how these bounds depend on the distribution of private information and on the communication structure -in particular the richness of the message space. Third, we design and conduct an experiment where we vary both the communication structure and the distribution of private information.
There are several results from this study. First, in the experiment we find that communication has significant beneficial effects only when the group members communicate in natural language, which is very rich. Restricting subjects to coarser message spaces, such as a binary message space or to onetime reports of their private information partially solves the coordination problem, but not enough to produce a statistically significant improvement compared with groups that were not allowed to communicate. A second finding is that the effectiveness of pre-play communication depends on the distribution of private information. In half of our data, it was common knowledge that all subjects had contribution costs that were less than or equal to the benefit of the public good, implying that it was common knowledge that, for every subject, it is optimal to contribute if their contribution is pivotal for the provision of the public good. In the other half of the data, the distribution of contribution costs was such that its support included costs that exceeded the benefit, and hence it was was common knowledge that any group member with such a high cost has a dominant strategy to free ride. In this second variant, natural language communication was much less effective and helped only after significant experience was gained. This sharp difference in the effect of communication is also reflected in the theoretical bounds implied by the optimal mechanism. A binding individual rationality constraint, which is present only in the high cost treatment, sharply reduces amount of public good provision that can be supported. Thus, we establish both theoretically and behaviorally, that the effectiveness of private communication depends on both the richness of the message space and the distribution of private information.
To keep the analysis and experimental design simple, players in the threshold public goods game have only a binary choice -to contribute or not, and the public good is produced if and only if at least some threshold number of group members choose to contribute, with the threshold being less than the group size. This class of games includes the social dilemmas studied by Dawes et al. (1986) , Offerman et al. (1998) , and Palfrey and Rosenthal (1991) , and shares similar strategic elements to the volunteer's dilemma, entry games, and participation games studied by Goeree and Holt (2005) . Contributions are non-refundable, so that an efficient outcome requires that exactly the threshold number of contributions are made. Too many contributions or too few contributions reflect coordination failure. Because the group members have different contribution costs, (ex ante) efficient provision also requires that the contributions are made only by the lowest cost members of the group.
Thus heterogeneity of contribution costs create a second kind of coordination problem, and private information exacerbates this latter coordination problem with an incentive compatibility problem. In all cases there is a free rider problem, in the sense that any contributing member would prefer to switch roles with any non-contributing member, regardless of their contribution costs.
The three forms of preplay communication we consider were carefully chosen. The coarsest possible message space we consider is binary. 1 In the communication stage with binary messages, each group member announces an "intention" to either contribute or not, which is then followed by a simultaneous-move contribution stage with binding decisions, so the communication stage can be viewed as a direct signal about contribution in the final stage of the game or alternatively as a "practice game", where one's first round contribution decision has no direct payoff consequences. The second message space is somewhat richer, where group members simultaneously each announce any number in the support of the distribution of contribution costs, thus mimicking a direct mechanism (but without a mediator), which is then followed by a contribution stage with binding decisions. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The related literature is reviewed in Section 2.
Section 3 specifies the experimental design, theoretical framework and the central hypotheses. Section 4 presents the experimental results and analysis. The last section concludes.
1 A binary message space was also explored in past work (Palfrey and Rosenthal 1993) .
Experiments
Threshold public goods games have been implemented in the laboratory by few researchers. Bagnoli and McKee (1991) find that the Pareto efficient outcome emerges when the cost of the good, the payoffs to those in the group, and the initial wealth positions of those in the group are common knowledge.
They report that if the collective valuation of a group exceeds the cost of the good, the members of the group voluntarily contribute exactly the cost of the public good. Van de Kragt et al. (1983) show that free communication via general, unstructured discussion produces better outcomes than the same games conducted without communication in the context of public goods games similar to the one implemented by us. The message space was the entire English language and speaking order was entirely endogenous, occurring in continuous time with face-to-face communication. An important distinction from our game is that the contribution costs were equal for all players and common knowledge.
Thus, Van de Kragt et al. (1983) eliminated two important impediments to coordination -private information and heterogeneity in costs. More structured cheap talk environments with public goods have been examined by Smith (1980) and Ferejohn et al. (1982) . They considered the problem of designing auction-like auction processes for the provision of discrete public good. Palfrey and Rosenthal (1991) report results from games similar to the three-person threshold games considered in this paper and conclude that in the absence of communication, behavior is closely approximated by the Bayesian equilibrium predictions, except that subjects contribute slightly more often than predicted. In other experiments, they implemented a binary message stage prior to the decision making stage and found that this type of communication fails to provide more efficient outcomes than the 'no communication' outcome. They also found that subjects use a cutoff decision rule when it is optimal to do so in the 'no communication' treatment, while players' behavior is less systematic with communication. 
Theoretical Framework
In this section, we use a mechanism design approach to develop theoretical bounds on the range of behavior and efficiency that can be achieved under the different communication regimes. There are four sources of inefficiency that can arise. The first is wasteful undercontribution, which arises when exactly one individual contributes and the public good is not provided. The second is wasteful overcontribution, which arises when all three individuals contribute. The public good is provided, but could have been provided at lower cost. Both of these inefficiencies are coordination failures, and can also arise where there is no private information and all players have the same cost to contribution.
The third source of inefficiency is the classic free rider problem, whereby the public good is not provided even though, given the cost realizations, it would be efficient to provide it. The fourth source inefficiency, which is information, arises when the public good is provided with exactly two contributors, but their costs are not the two lowest.In this section we explore the extent to which communication can mitigate the efficiency losses from these four sources of inefficiency.
The Environment
A group consisting of N persons is undertaking a project. Each group member is endowed with one indivisible unit of input, which may be either consumed or "contributed" to the production of the group project. The project succeeds if and only if at least K units are contributed. The value of the project to any individual is normalized to equal 1. The private value of the endowed unit of input to an individual i is denoted by c i . Each person knows his or her own c i but only knows that the other players' c's are independent random draws from a cumulative distribution distribution F on [0, C], where F is common knowledge and C > 0. F is admissible if F (0) = 0, F (C) = 1 and F is continuously differentiable on [0, C], and we assume throughout that F is admissible. The utility for player i with cost c i is given by: 1 + c i if i does not contribute and at least K others contribute c i if i does not contribute and fewer than K others contribute 1 if i contributes and at least K − 1 other contributes 0 if i contributes and and fewer than K − 1 others contribute Formally the four sources of inefficiency are the following: wasteful undercontribution, where exactly k ∈ {1, ..., K −1} individuals contribute and the public good is not provided; excess contributions, where exactly k ∈ {K + 1, ..., N } contribute; underprovision, where the public good is not provided even though there exist K individuals such that the sum of their costs is less than N (the total social benefit of providing the public good); and cost inefficiency, where the public good is provided with exactly K contributors, but their costs are not the K lowest costs. We next explore the extent to which a benevolent mechanism designer can mitigate the ex ante welfare losses from these three sources of inefficiency.
Baseline Lower Bound: Equilibrium without communication
We first consider the positive contribution symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game without communication. 4 This is a relevant lower bound for efficiency for all four treatments, and provides the upper bound as well for the no-communication treatment.
This Bayesian equilibrium is characterized by a cutpoint strategy, c * : player i contributes if an only if c i ≤ c * . In our case with a uniform distribution of contribution costs, c * solves the equation
The left hand side is the opportunity cost of contributing for a player a private cost of c * and the right hand side is the probability that the player's contribution is pivotal.
In equilibrium these two are equal. Players with a cost below c * are better off contributing, given others are using the c * decision rule and players with private costs greater than c * are better off not contributing. Individuals with a cost of exactly c * are indifferent between contributing and not contributing. Thus, for C = 1, the equilibrium is c * 1.0 = .5 and for C = 1.5, the equilibrium is c * 1.5 = .375. with equilibrium when C = 1 as there would be incentives to over report token values. Furthermore, if C = 1.5 then it is not consistent with equilibrium because ex post individual rationality would be violated: specifically, this 'first best outcome' could not be achieved when one or both of the lower two costs are great than 1. Alternatively, in this C = 1.5 environment one might hope that a 'constrained first best outcome' would be supportable by a communication equilibrium, where (a) individuals with the lower two token values only contribute if both of the lower two token values are less than or equal to 1, and (b) no one contributes if one or both of the lower two token values are higher than 1.
However, this would clearly violate incentive compatibility, for the same reasons the first best is not incentive compatible for C = 1.
For the two communication mechanisms with essentially continuous message spaces (token revelation and unrestricted chat), we use mechanism design theory to characterize the optimal equilibrium.
We model the communication game as direct mechanism in which we imagine that each individual independently submits a report of their private cost to the mechanism designer from the support of possible costs (either [0, 1] or [0, 1.5]). The mechanism designer, after receiving all three reports, makes a recommendation to each player to either contribute or not. An incentive compatible and ex post individually rational mechanism is one in which, given the mechanism designer's recommendation strategy (which may be randomized), it is optimal for each player to honestly report their true private cost and to obey the recommendation of the mechanism designer. Among this class of mechanisms we identify the symmetric one that optimizes the ex ante group payoff. 6 After this characterization, we 5 Palfrey and Rosenthal (1991) characterize a class of equilibria in these games with binary communication. 6 Symmetry is without loss of generality.
turn to the binary communication games, where the characterization is different due to the restricted message space.
The optimal mechanism design problem it must (p, a) must satisfy a collection of interim individual rationality constraints-expected payoff from the mechanism must be nonnegative. Feasibility requires that (p, a) satisfies an expected budget constraint. That is, (p, a) is feasible if and only if p(c) ≤
, for all profiles of individual costs, c = (c 1 , ..., c N ). That is the expected sum of the payments must be at least K times the probability the public good is produced. Without loss of generality we can restrict ourselves to symmetric mechanisms in these symmetric environments, so the p functions and the a functions are anonymous. We then work with the reduced form of the mechanism, denoted by (P, A), where
is the expected probability of provision from an interim standpoint for an individual who has valuation c i ; and A : [0, C] → [0, 1] is the expected probability of i contributing from an interim standpoint for an individual who has valuation c i . That is:
, for all c ∈ [0, C] N , the corresponding reduced form mechanism, (P, A), also must satisfy the budget constraint in expectation, which can be written
We refer to a mechanism as budget balanced if (??) holds with equality. We next proceed by characterizing the optimal reduced form mechanism, in two different cost distributions, which are used in the experiment.
Low cost distribution: C = 1
The C = 1 case is the simplest case 9 because in any budget balanced mechanism, the ex post individual rationality constraint will not be binding. We will derive the optimal mechanism below, without imposing the ex post individual rationality constraint, and then show that the optimal mechanism is budget balanced and hence the ex post individual rationality constraint is not binding. Thus, for the case of C = 1 the optimal mechanism is characterized as the solution to the following program:
subject to
The first constraint is incentive compatibility and the other constraints are feasibility. Following standard arguments from Bayesian mechanism design (see for example Ledyard and Palfrey 2002) , one can show that the solution to this optimization problem is the full provision lottery draft mechanism.
That is, the public good is always produced and a random subset of K individuals contribute, without regard to individual cost realizations. Thus, the two coordination problems (overcontribution and overcontribution) and the underprovision inefficiency are perfectly so lved, but the fourth source of inefficiency, cost ineffiency, is ignored. The reason cost inefficiency is ignored is that the only way to sort out lower cost types from higher cost types is to sometimes fail to produce the public good.
That is solving the cost inefficiency problem would require reducing the probability the public good 8 In principle, there is also the question about whether additional implementability conditions may impose further constraints on the problem, i.e., the question of whether the optimal reduced form mechanism can be feasibly implemented by a (p, a) mechanism. As it turns out, for this class of problems it is not an issue. 9 The results for this case extend easily to any C such that 0 < C ≤ 1, as shown in the appendix.
is provided. But the cost of failing to produce the public good is extremely high. In particular, it is very high relative to the relatively benefits of shifting the cost burden in the direction of lower cost agents.This result is summarized in the following proposition, and a proof is provided in an appendix. If the cost distribution admits costs with c i > 1, as is the case when C = 1.5, then ex post individual rationality constraints play a role in characterizating the optimal communication mechanism, because it is irrational for any individual with a cost c i > 1 to contribute, since the individual benefit is only 1.
Thus, the solution of (??) characterized in Proposition 1 violates ex post individual rationality when C > 1, and the analysis becomes more complicated.
We can write the ex post individual rationality constraint in the reduced form as:
This constraint also implies that P (c) must be constant for all c > 1, and we will denote this 
subject to (4)
Following arguments similar to the proof of Proposition 1, we can characterize the optimal com-munication mechanism as a solution to (??). The mechanism is not perfectly flat, as was the case for C = 1, but it is as flat as possible, given the binding constraint imposed by ex post individual rationality. Specifically, P and A have two flat components, which are separated at a critical cost level, c * . Individuals with cost above c * never contribute. Individuals with cost below c * all contribute with the same probability. 
Proof. See Appendix A.
This mechanism solves the first two problems of miscoordination, because budget balance is always satisfied. On the other hand, the existence of an ex post individual rationality constraint means that the public good is not provided, so the free rider problem is not fully solved. In fact, because C = 1.5
and only two contributors are required, it is always efficient to provide the public good because the total cost of providing it is always less than 3, which is equal to the sum of public good benefits to the group. The cost inefficiency problem is also not solved in this mechanism. As with the earlier case where C ≤ 1, solving the cost inefficiency problem would require reducing the probability the public good is provided. The cost of reducing the provision probability is very high relative to the benefits of shifting the cost burden to the lower cost agents.
Binary communication cutpoint equilibrium The optmial mechanisms described above cannot be implemented with a single round of simultaneous binary communication, which is the simplest possible message space we explore in the experiment. The message space is just not rich enough to implement a jointly controlled lottery to randomly selecting exactly K contributors when more than 
and the expected payoff for announcing "1" is:
Equating these expressions and collecting terms gives:
The cutpoint in the contribution stage, c 3 , is characterized by the player with c i = c 3 is indifferent between contributing and not contributing, given everyone else is using equilibrium strategies. This indifference equation is given by:
which reduces to:
The equilibrium is obtained by simultaneously solving ?? and ?? for (c c ,c 3 ). For our parameters 10 Thus, reporting a "1" is interpreted in equilibrium as a conditional promise to contribute. 11 Obviously such equilibria can also be implemented with any richer message space, including our token revelation message space and the open chat message space.
(C = 1 and C = 1.5), the binary communication equilibrium cutpoints are summarized in Table 1 . It is interesting to note that the CCE does not eliminate all the miscoordination inefficiencies. It is possible for exactly one player to contribute, if his value is less than c 3 and the other two players have values between c 3 and c c . Given the parameters of the experiment the chance this happens in the CCE is very low: probability 0.05 for C = 1 and probability 0.03 for C = 1.5. Similarly, it is possible for overcontribution in equilibrium, if all three players have values less than c 3 . Given the parameters of the experiment the chance this happens in the CCE is also very low: probability 0.07 for C = 1 and probability 0.03 for C = 1.5. Hence the welfare losses from such miscoordination is very low in expected terms, partly because the event is unlikely and partly because the value of the wasted contribution is low.
Compared to the optimal mechanism with unlimited communication, the welfare losses in the communication equilibrium are still very large because of the high probability of non-provision. The probability of non-provision is approximately 0.39 for C = 1, which is nearly as great as the the probability of non-provision in the symmetric Bayes Nash equilibrium (0.50), and far worse than the optimal mechanism, which always produces the public good. For C = 1.5 the probability of nonprovision is 0.56, which is much less than the probability of non-provision in the symmetric Bayes Nash equilibrium, which is 0.84. Thus the potential gains from binary communication are greater for C = 1.5 than for C = 1.
Experimental Design and Hypotheses
The experimental design, procedures and treatments are discussed in Section 3.1. Section 3.2 provides the theoretical framework. The hypotheses that are formally tested are listed in Section 3.3.
Design, Procedures and Treatments
The experiments were conducted at the California Social Science Experimental Laboratory (CASSEL), University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) using the Multistage software package. Participants were recruited from a pool of volunteer subjects, maintained by CASSEL. A total of sixteen sessions were run, using 183 subjects. Each session consisted of 9-15 participants and no subject participated in more than one session 12 . Upon arrival, instructions were read aloud. Subjects interacted anonymously with each other through computer terminals. Sessions lasted from 30 to 50 minutes and participants earned on average US$18.47 in addition to a show-up fee of US$5 13 .
In all the experiments, we set K = 2 and N = 3. Each individual c i is an independent random draw from a uniform distribution on [0, C], and the experimental design allows for two values of C (1 and 1.5) corresponding to the two cases analyzed in the theoretical section of the paper. C = 1 means that it is common knowledge that everyone has costs lower than the public benefit and hence, no one has a dominated contribution strategy. However, in the situation with C = 1.5, individuals have a strictly dominant strategy not to contribute whenever c i > 1, implying the problem of ex post individual rationality in the communication equilibria.
The communication structure was varied in each of the two parametric configurations, C = 1 and C = 1.5. We used four communication treatments: "no communication", "binary communication", "direct revelation", and "unrestricted text chat", resulting in a 2 × 4 design. We ran two sessions for each of these treatments, thus a total of 16 sessions. The details of the experimental protocols are briefly discussed below 14 . Each session consisted of 20 rounds. After a round was over, participants were randomly rematched into new three person groups and everyone was independently and randomly assigned new costs. The random rematching was done to limit the reputation and super-game effects which might occur with repeated play.
No Communication
Contribution costs were implemented as opportunity costs. In each round, each subject was allocated a single indivisible "token", which had a private value that was referred to as a "token value". Subjects were informed that token values in integer increments between 1 to 100C points are independently drawn with replacement from identical uniform distributions and randomly assigned to subjects. Each subject was informed of her token value but knew only the probability distribution of other subjects' token values. Each subject was then asked to enter a decision to spend or keep their token. If at least two of the three subjects spent their token, then each subject received 100 points if she had chosen to spend her token, while the payoff was 100 points plus her token value if she had chosen to keep her token. If a subject chose to spend but none of her other group members spent their tokens then that subject earned 0 points in the round. If a subject chose to not to spend and fewer than two other 12 Eleven sessions had 12 subjects, four sessions had 9 subjects and one session had 15. 13 Payoffs ranged from US$11 to US$25.50 with a standard deviation of US$3.18. 14 For details, please see the instructions provided in Appendix B. group members spent their tokens then that subject earned her token value in the round. 15 
Binary Communication ("Binary")
Each round had two stages: a communication stage and a contribution stage. In the communication stage, subjects chose one of the two messages: "I intend to spend my token"; "I intend to keep my token". They were advised that these messages were not binding, and they could make either contribution decision regardless of which message they sent in the communication round. After these binary messages were sent, each person was told how many members in their group sent each message, and was reminded which message he or she had sent. This was directly followed by the contribution stage, where individuals made binding contribution decisions.
Direct Revelation ("Token")
Each round again had a communication stage and a contribution stage. In the communication stage, subjects had 20 seconds to send a message to the other members of her group. They were told that this message can only be an integer between 1 and 100C and each member was allowed to send only one such message. Thus, the message space in this treatment corresponds to the direct mechanism and is much larger than the "binary communication" sessions. Each subject observed the messages sent by her group members. Each subject was also told that in the event she did not send any message, the other members of her group would see a " ? " against her subject id at the end of the 20 seconds. After the communication stage was over, individuals made contribution decisions. We called this treatment "token" because subjects had the opportunity to reveal their true token values. If token values were revealed truthfully, there would be the opportunity for perfect coordination in the C = 1 condition, with the two individuals with the lowest token values contributing. In principle, the same could occur in the C = 1.5 condition, provided at least two individuals had token values no greater than 100.
Unrestricted Broadcast Text Chat ("Chat")
This treatment consisted of the same number of rounds as in the other ones and had the same two stages, with the only difference being in the structure of the communication stage. Prior to the contribution stage, every group had a discussion period which lasted 60 seconds, during which subjects could send messages to the other members of her group. Individuals were told that the messages had to conform to certain rules, including that they must be relevant to the experiment and subjects should not send messages intended to reveal their identity. Thus, the message space under this treatment is 15 Due to an error in the computer program, no subject received a token value equal to 100 in the C = 1 treatment and 150 in the C = 1.5 treatment; the actual distribution was uniform from 1 to 99 or 149, respectively.
'anonymous, unrestricted and unstructured text messages' and is much larger than the finite message space under the "token revelation" sessions. Importantly, this treatment gave subjects the opportunity to employ natural language.
Hypotheses
We test several hypotheses regarding (a) the effect of communication on efficiency, (b) comparison across communication treatments differing in the richness of message space, and (c) differences across C = 1 and C = 1.5 sessions.
The effect of communication on efficiency is broken down into four separate hypotheses with respect to the total earnings generated, the likelihood of public good provision, the number of con- The ex ante efficient solution is for just two individuals to contribute their token as needed, and for the contributors to be the ones with the two lowest costs while the free rider is the one with the highest cost (ignoring ties). Without communication, it is impossible for players to know who has relatively high valuations and who has relatively low ones. Thus the "efficient" outcome can occur only by chance. However, with sufficient communication, it is at least feasible to coordinate decisions in a way that produces this desired outcome. Thus, we can expect to have fewer wasteful contributions, that is, fewer incidences of one or three individuals contributing in the case with communication.
In other words, communication leads to lower production inefficiency by lowering both over and under-contributions. Also, conditional on the public good being provided, we should have a higher percentage of the subjects with the two lowest costs contributing when communication is allowed.
Thus, communication can help in two ways: one by reducing coordination failures (such that only two contribute) and other by making the two lowest costs contributing. Hence, we have the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 3a (Under-contribution Hypothesis). The incidence of exactly one person in a group contributing is lower in the communication sessions than in the non-communication sessions.
Hypothesis 3b (Over-contribution Hypothesis). The incidence of all members in a group contributing is lower in the communication sessions than in the non-communication sessions.
Hypothesis 4 (Efficiency Hypothesis). Conditional on the public good being provided, the incidence of individuals with the lower two costs contributing is higher with communication than under no communication.
We study three different forms of communication structure. While the binary communication sessions use an exchange of binary messages, the token communication sessions have a much larger although finite message space, including a null message. The 'unrestricted text chat', while anonymous, uses the entire English language in continuous time. Hence, we have a progression in the treatments in terms of the richness of the message space implemented. One would expect that it would be easier to implement efficient outcomes as the message space becomes richer and this leads to a hypthesis that there will be a monotonic relation between efficiency and richness of the message space:
Hypothesis 5 (Monotone Hypothesis). Efficiency increases with the richness of the message space.
It is highest in the chat treatment, followed by the token treatment, followed by the binary treatment, and lowest in the no communication treatment.
The final hypothesis compares the provision of public good across the two different C sessions.
When it is common knowledge that every member's cost is less than the benefit from the public good, 100% provision of public good is possible. However, in the C = 1.5 case, it is no longer possible to provide the public good all the time assuming subjects do not use dominated strategies. Indeed the probability that the good isn't provided equals 7 27 , when at least two of the subjects have costs greater than 100. This gives us the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 6 (C Hypothesis). For each communication protocol, the probability of public good provision is greater in the C = 1 sessions than in the C = 1.5 sessions.
Results
The results from the experiments are reported in this section. We first present the results from testing the specific hypotheses that we discussed earlier. 
Group Outcomes and Test of Hypotheses
The first hypothesis involves a comparison between the average earnings without communication to the average earnings with the three communication treatments. Table 2 Next, we turn to the following question: Does communication help in reducing production inefficiency in the form of wasteful contributions? While the frequency with which exactly one group member contributes is always lower with communication in rounds 11-20, the difference is significant only for the 'unrestricted chat' treatment (see Table 4 ). Also, there is a decline over time in the propor- Result 3a. For both cost treatments, the incidence of exactly one person in a group contributing is lower in all communication treatments. It is significantly lower in the chat condition (support for H3a).
session. 18 These are results from one-tailed tests of difference in two independent proportions. For the C = 1 situation, the data numbers do not satisfy the criteria: n(1 − p) > 5, where n is the number of observations and p is the proportion. But its easy to infer that the proportion is almost 1 under 'unrestricted chat' and hence there would be a significant difference when compared with the 'no communication' session.
Result 3b. For both cost treatments, the incidence of all three persons in a group contributing is lower in all communication treatments. It is significantly lower only in the C = 1 chat condition (support for H3b). The most efficient outcome occurs when exactly two people in a group contribute and those two have the lower two costs. Conditional on the good being provided, of times the subjects with the lower two costs contribute across the four treatments and for each C session. The numbers are quite high, even without communication. With C = 1, full efficiency would require 100% of the time the two lowest costs contribute. Obtaining 86.4% in the last 10 rounds of unrestricted chat is very much higher than pure chance. Furthermore, the loss in value from not always having the lowest cost contributors is quite small: only 8.2 per round (See Figure 1 ). With C = 1.5, the benchmark for the actual draw of tokens is 74% given individual rationality constraints 19 .
Contributors
The incidence of subjects with the two lowest costs in a group contributing is higher in all Summarizing the above results, we find that the structure of communication is crucial in determining whether there is are significant gains over the situation where communication is not possible.
The simultaneous exchange of binary messages aimed at disclosing intentions as well as the one-time broadcasting of a numerical message lead to some improvements, particularly with respect to a re- 19 The draw of tokens differs across communications variation, making the 74.
duction in the frequency of miscoordination, but these gains are for the most part not large enough in magnitude to significantly improve average earnings and the probability of public good provision.
With these coarser communication structures, groups also are generally not successful in identifying the members with lower two token values to contribute. Only when a rich form of continuous time communication with a "common language" is possible, are there significant gains in efficiency. While these gains are enormous (approaching the first best outcomes) in the the C = 1 treatment where it is common knowledge that everyone has a cost that is less than the benefit from the public good, these gains are harder to achieve in the C = 1.5 treatment, where some individuals can have private costs that exceed the private benefit.
Given results 1-4, it is now straightforward to test Hypothesis 5. Whether it is measured with
respect to the average group earnings, likelihood of public good provision, incidence of wasteful contributions, or the subjects with lower two costs contributing, there is no strict progression in efficiency as we move from no communication to binary to a larger numerical message space to finally the "infinite" communication structure. The relation between efficiency and the richness of message space is weakly monotonic, but not strictly monotonic as hypothesized.
Result 5. Efficiency does not increase monotonically in the richness of the message space of the communication stage (reject H5). It is significantly higher only for the chat treatment.
The final hypothesis compares the likelihood of providing the public good in C = 1 and C = 1.5
sessions. There were 489 instances out of 1918 total observations (that is 25.5% of the cases) when at least two of the subjects in a group had costs higher than 100 in the C = 1.5 sessions. The public good was provided in 6 out of 114 observations in the 'binary communication' treatment. In the other treatments, the good was never provided when there was only one person in a group having a cost less than 100 (out of a total of 375 such instances). These numbers strongly support Hypothesis 6.
As can be seen from Table 3 , public good provision is much higher in the C = 1 sessions than in the corresponding C = 1.5 sessions. The differences are significant at the 1% level for direct revelation communication and unrestricted chat, and at the 5% level for the 'no communication' sessions.
Result 6. Keeping the communication protocol fixed, the probability of public good provision is greater in the C = 1 sessions than in the C = 1.5 sessions (support for H6).
The quantitative effects of communication on normalized efficiency
We now turn to the analysis of how the outcomes compare with the theoretical bounds discussed in section 3.2 as well as the first-best outcome. Third, in all of the C = 1 treatments efficiency is lower than in the Bayes-Nash equilibrium. Fourth, in contrast to the third finding, for the C = 1.5 data, normalized efficiencies are always higher than the Bayes Nash equilibrium. 
Individual Behavior: Messaging and Contribution Strategies
In this section, we take a deeper look at the individual choice data as a function of individual token values. We describe several findings about the strategies used by subjects in the communication stage, and about how the messages in the communication stage affected contribution decisions. These are presented below, separately for each of the communication structures implemented. We use data from the last 10 rounds in this section. 21 20 Interestingly, in the 'unrestricted chat' with C = 1, groups do even slightly better than the best IC mechanism and are close to the first-best outcome. 21 For C = 1.5, unless otherwise noted the observations with token values higher than 99 are dropped in this section because these individuals have a dominant strategy not to contribute, and almost never do. Across all communication
Binary Communication
We start by analyzing the decision of whether to send an intent to spend message or an intent to keep message, and to compare this with the theoretical communication equilibrium given in Table 1 .
Theoretically, an intent to spend message should be observed 61% of the time in the C = 1 treatment and 72% of the time in the C = 1.5 treatment (conditional on token values less than 100). The observed values were 66% and 81%, respectively. Thus, intent to spend messages were observed more frequently in the C = 1.5 treatment, but in both cases such messages were observed more frequently than in the communication equilibrium given in Table 1 . In both treatments, the frequency of intent to spend messages was increasing in token value, as shown in the probit regression results displayed in Table 6 .
Next, we look at the effect of the binary messages on the spending decision of a subject. Table 7 shows the effect own binary message and the profile of binary messages of the other two members of the group on own contribution decision. Because the messages are sent anonymously, it only depends on the number of other "intend to spend" messages in the group. The entries in the table are the contribution rates of the subject in each category. Based on the theoretical communication equilibrium in Table 1 , when C = 1, an individual is expected to contribute 74% of the time after she said that she intended to contribute in the message stage, while this number is 65% for C = 1.5 sessions. When C was 1, an individual contributed 55% of the time after she said that she intended to contribute in the message stage, while this number was 66% for C = 1.5 sessions. In contrast, individuals are expected to never contribute when they send an intent to keep message. Only 20% of the time did a person contribute after sending an intent to keep message in the C = 1 sessions, while the comparable percentage for C = 1.5 groups was 19%. The main departure from the theoretical conditional contribution rates, is that in theory, if you treatments, in 632 cases where an individual's token value was greater than 100, there were only 11 observations of contribution.
Number of others saying "I intend to spend" Message sent by me 0 1 2 C = 1 "I intend to spend" 0.41 (22) 0.60 (48) 0.56 (90) "I intend to keep" 0.25 (12) 0.23 (44) 0.13 (24) C = 1.5 "I intend to spend" 0.38 (21) 0.82 (49) 0.62 (58) "I intend to keep" 0.00 (1) 0.16 (19) 0.27 (11) and exactly one other individual sends a spend message then your predicted contribution rate is 100%.
This is not what we observe in the data, especially in the C = 1 data. In the C = 1 sessions, out of 48 observations with "I intend to spend my token" with exactly one other member sending this message, only 29 contribute. When no other member sent that message, only 9 of 22 contributed, but in the communication equilibrium none of these should be contributing. When both other members also reported that they intended to spend 49 out of 90 contributed (54%), while in theory this is predicted to be somewhat greater (70%). For C = 1.5 sessions, only 38% of subjects who reported an intent to spend carry out that intent when nobody else in the group send the spend message. This contrasts with much higher rates when at least one other member says they intend to spend: 82% with one other and 62% with two others.
While these conditional contribution rates are different from the theoretical ones implied by Table   1 , they reveal some interesting patterns in the contribution rates of individual who report an intent to spend. First, individuals are always more likely than not to carry out a reported intent to spend than not only if at least one other member of the group also reports an intent to spend. Second, this effect is strongest when exactly one other member reports an intent to spend. These patterns provide some additional insight into the earlier finding that binary communication partially alleviates the coordination failure that occurs when exactly one individual contribute (see Tables 3 and 4) .
Individuals who report an intent to keep are always much more likely to keep than spend, regardless of how many other members of the group report an intent to spend. In cases where an individual reports "intend to keep", the effect of other messages on contribution decisions is small, and with no clear pattern. In the C = 1 treatment, the probability of contributing declines very slightly with the number of other members who intend to spend, but it goes the other direction in the C = 1 treatment.
To evaluate the statistical significance of these effects, Table 8 shows the results of a probit regression with contribution decision as the binary dependent variable, as well as whether the subject sent the message "I intend to spend my token" (m i = 1) or "I intend to keep my token" (m i = 0).
We denote the number of other members in a group saying "I intend to spend" in the message stage as M −i . The independent variables are as follows: own token value (tokenvalue i ), 1{M −i = 1}: a binary variable indicating whether exactly one of the other two members sent the message "I intend to spend" and 1{M −i = 2}: a binary variable indicating whether both the other members sent the message "I intend to spend".
The regression results in Table 8 confirm the effects identified in Table 7 . Given that an individual has sent "I intend to spend" message, she is more likely to contribute if there was at least one other member who expressed the willingness to spend in the message stage. This effect is significant in three of four cases, and the effect is strongest if there was exactly one other person in the group who reported an intent to spend. In contrast, none of the M −i coefficients are significant in case m i = 0 Marginal effects from probit regression with "contribution decision" as the dependant variable, evaluated at the means of the independent variables. Standard errors, clustered at the subject level, are in parentheses.
Token Revelation
In the 'token revelation' treatment, individuals rarely chose the option of sending an empty message (7.5% of the time in C = 1 groups and 14% of the time when C was 1.5). In C = 1 groups, 49% of the reports were truthful and 41% of the reports were lower than the true token values, while individuals over-reported their token values only 10% of the time. A similar pattern was observed in the C = 1.5 groups, where 44% of the reports were truthful, 38% were under-reported and 18% over-reported.
Again, from the prevalence of under-reporting of token values it seems that individuals were trying to signal their group members that they can expect a contribution, perhpas believing that their own low report would induce others to contribute. In the C = 1.5 sessions, individuals with token values greater than 100 under-reported 55% of the time while they reported truthfully around 35% of the time. This behavior is more difficult to rationalize, but again it's possible that subjects again thought this would induce greater contribution by others. Out of 71 such instances when their token values were higher than 100, 36 times they sent a message less than 100. That appears to be one of the primary reasons of why efficiency is so low with direct mechanism communication when C is 1.5. In contrast, out of 135 cases when the token value was less than 100, only 16% of the time individuals sent a message greater than 100. They were truthful 48% of the time and over-reported 23% of the time. Table 9 1{tokenvalue i > max{m j } j =i }: a binary variable indicating whether or not the subject's token value is greater than the messages sent by other two members. We expect the sign of the coefficient on the variable 1{tokenvalue i > max{m j } j =i } to be negative, meaning that an individual is less likely to contribute if her tokenvalue is higher than the other two members' reports. The coefficient is significant and negative only for C = 1 groups. Also, there is no systematic effect of own token value on the individual contribution decision. These findings, coupled with the fact that there is widespread 0.104 0.110 * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Table 9 : Message behavior in the direct mechansim communication treatment: Linear regression with reported token value as the dependant variable. Standard errors, clustered at the subject level, are in parentheses.
Unrestricted Text Chat
We investigate the question of how pre-play communication in the form of unrestricted text chat helps subjects achieve higher payoffs. Table 10 gives the details of how many times a group reached some form of an agreement about the possible profile of actions to be taken by the members in the group 22 The few observations where a subject did not send a message are dropped from the regression. 23 The observations where at least one member of a group did not send any message are dropped. Groups reached an agreement nearly 88% of the time in C = 1 treatment, and these agreements were carried out 94% of the time (99 out of 105). The ability of groups to reach agreements and carry them out was not nearly as successful in the C = 1.5 treatment. The percentage of groups who reached an agreement was only 58%, which is significantly lower. Moreover, of those groups that reached agreement, only 38% (35 out of 93) carried out the agreement. The qualitative nature of the agreements was also different across the cost treatments. In the C = 1.5 treatment fewer than half the agreements (38 out of 93) were for exactly two of the group members to spend, the efficient outcome, and only 20 of these groups carried out that efficient agreement. Just as many groups agreed to the non-credible agreement for all three to contribute. Not surpisingly these agreements were carried out only 8% of the time (3 out of 38). The agreements in the C = 1 treatment were much different. 98 out of 105 agreements were for exactly two contributors and this was carried out 94% of the time (92 out of 98). There were five agreements for all three to spend and, perhaps surprisingly, all of these agreements were carried out. The difference between the C = 1.5 and C = 1 treatments is even starker after subjects have gained experience. In rounds 11-20 of the C = 1 treatment agreements were nearly always reached (56/60) and moreover all 56 agreements were for exactly two contributors, and only once did the agreement failed to be carried out. In rounds 11-20 of the C = 1.5 groups, there was a slight increase in the number of agreements for exactly two contributors (from 12/80 to 26/80), but these agreements were carried out less than half the time, which is the same rate as in the early rounds. Otherwise there was no notable change with experience in group agreements for the C = 1.5 groups.
A group agrees to either of the three action profiles: (i) all members will spend their token, (ii) two of the members will spend their tokens, or (iii) everybody in the group will keep their tokens. Table 12 shows that when a group decides that all members should keep their tokens, they carry out this agreement quite well, almost 100% of the time, but when everyone in a group decides to spend their tokens, then only in a few number of cases they carry out this action. Of course, this is expected as a member might think that she could just keep her token while the other two are going to spend.
This thinking actually leads to none or only one person contributing. (5) 1 (3) 6 (12) 0 (19) 11-20 54 (80) 6 (6) 1 (3) 14 (26) 3 (19) All rounds 93 (160) 10 (11) 2 (6) 20 (38) 3 (38) To summarize, the most striking feature of the chat communication is that when a group reaches an agreement in the C = 1 sessions in rounds 11-20, 100% of the time they decide that exactly 2 members will spend their tokens and they nearly always carry out this agreed upon profile of actions.
Rounds
This explains the extremely high efficiency levels reached in rounds 11-20 in C = 1 sessions. This degree of success is not even close to being achieve by the C = 1.5 groups, although the frequency of groups agreeing to profiles where exactly two memebers spend their tokens is slightly higher in rounds 11-20, which accounts for the slightly the higher efficiency in rounds 11-20 than the first ten rounds of play in the C = 1.5 groups. 25 
Content Analysis of Chat Messages
Finally, we provide a content analysis of the discussion in the communication round of the chat sessions to give a more complete picture of how the chat communication facilitated cooperation and coordination. Each message sent by a subject was coded into one of the nine mutually exclusive categories, 25 Informative/explaining something to group members but not any strategy suggestion if 2 spend then they both get 100; token values can never be higher than 100 I plan to spend spending; I will spend I plan to keep keeping; I will keep Conditional statement or ambiguous/contradictory statement I will spend if someone else spends; I will keep if you two spend; "I will keep" then later on says "I will spend"; I will spend or keep Irrelevant/Junk lol; hehehe as enlisted in Table 13 . The table also contains some verbatim examples of sentences/messages that fall under each category that were used in our experiments. While the instructions did not indicate that the chat was to be in English, subjects communicated in a language that was closer to SMS texts than to ordinary English. Table 14 gives the percentage of all messages that fall in these nine categories in all four sessions of the 'unrestricted chat' treatment. While "confirmation"/"strategy suggestion"/"revelation of own token value" were used a lot in the C = 1 sessions, there was a predominance of informative discussions and messages related to revealing the intent to spend in the C = 1.5 sessions. Messages falling in categories "strategy suggestion" and "confirmation" were used less in sessions with C = 1.5 than in the C = 1 sessions. Thus, we see that revealing one's own token value coupled with a strategy suggestion about one's own as well as the entire group's strategies helps in achieving "efficient" outcomes in the situation when it is common knowledge that everyone has costs less than the 'public' benefit. However, in the other situation, there is a lack of use of these message categories and efficiency is also not as high.
Apart from this, a closer look at the transcript of the text chat reveals that in the C = 1.5 sessions there is a lot of discussion regarding lying, trust and promises whereas, none of these terms are used when C = 1. So, in the C = 1.5 sessions, there is an atmosphere of mistrust which is certainly a reason as to why subjects do not do as well in these sessions even with unrestricted text chat. A quote from one of the texts from a subject aptly summarizes the situation: "this test really shows how low 
Conclusion
We investigated the effect on efficiency, in a public good game where player endowments are private there is no 'obvious' way to interpret the binary or the numerical messages among subjects. The natural language results hold even when the groups are rotated every round, as is the case in our experiments. Unrestricted chat gives the subjects the opportunity to understand and interpret each others' intentions and messages. Also, gains relative to the situation with no communication are higher when it is common knowledge that everyone has costs less than the 'public' benefit. This is intuitive because in this situation the question is not whether the good should be provided but rather which of the two people in a group are going to provide it. In contrast, in the sessions where it is possible for individuals to have higher costs than the 'public' benefit, first one needs to figure out whether a good should be provided and hence, there are more chances of mis-coordination and mis-representation. 
The first incentive constraint, A(c) = −U (c) implies we can write 26 We conjecture that the requirement that F be admissible is stronger than is needed. Perhaps all that is needed is that there are no mass points.
we can rewrite ?? as
which is equivalent to:
subject to Whatever the solution, it must be that A * (·) solves:
Because F is nonnegative and strictly increasing and A is required to be nonincreasing, this immediately implies that A * = 0 and hence A * (c) = A for all c. Because A * is flat, incentive compatibility implies that P * is also flat, with P * (c) = P * (0) for all c.Furthermore, it must be that A * is as small as possible, subject to the feasibility constraint, implying immediately that
Hence, the problem reduces to finding the optimal flat mechanism that is also budget balanced, which trivially implies P * (c) = 1 for all c and A * (c) = K N ∀c. In other words, the public good is always provided, and exactly K individuals are randomly selected to contribute. Observe that ex post individual rationality is satisfied and also that implementability of the reduced form mechanism is trivial.Thus, the ex ante efficient mechanism does not use any information about types. It completely solves the coordination problem of over-and under-contribution, and the free rider problem but is completely unable to resolve the informational souce of cost inefficiency which would require low cost types to contribute more often than high cost types.
We conjecture that the requirement that F be admissible is stronger than is needed. Perhaps all that is needed is that there are no mass points. Because IC implies A(c) = −U (c) ∀c, we have:
so the optimization problem can be rewritten as:
where 1 1.5 is just the density function of the cost distribution. This is equivalent to:
Let ( P * , A * , P * , c * ) be a solution to (??), denote A = c * 0 A(c) 1 1.5 dc. If this is optimal, then it must be that the budget constraint holds with equality. That is:
If not, P can be increased without violating any constraints and increases the objective function,
This implies that whenever the public good is produced, it is produced with exactly K contributions. Second, as in the case studied earlier, with C ≤ 1, for any A, A * (c) must solve:
Because F is nonnegative and strictly increasing and A is required to be nonincreasing, this immediately implies that A * = 0 and hence A * (c) = A * for all c ∈ [0, c * ]. Because A * is flat, incentive compatibility implies that P * is also flat, with P * (c) = P * for all c ∈ [0, c * ]. Next observe that, given any c * , P is maximized by producing the good whenever at least K individuals have a cost c ∈ [0, c * ].
Budget balance then implies that whenever this is the case, the individuals share the cost equally.
Hence the mechanism looks qualitatively very similar to the optimal mechansim when C ≤ 1. In the direct version of this mechanism, everyone reports their cost, if at least K individuals report a cost less than or equal to c * , the public good is produced and exactly K of these "low cost" individuals are randomly selected to contribute. Otherwise the public good is not produced at all. Finally, the critical cost, c * , is pinned down by incentive constraint on the c * type, who must be indifferent between reporting c * with an expected payoff of P * − c * A * and reporting some higher cost and getting an expected payoff of P * . Thus, c * is characterized by:
Where, by the characterization above, we have:
If there are multiple values of c * ∈ [0, 1) that solve ??, then the optimal mechanism corresponds to the highest such value of c * , because it leads to the highest possible value of P . 27
Solution for experimental parameters: K=2, N=3
Substituting into (??) the specific values K = 2, N = 3, and denoting q = c * 1.5 , we get
where q = c * 1.5 . Solving for q using (??) gives q = 0.5. Hence c * = 0.75, P * = 0.25, P * = 0.75 and
. The ex ante probability the public good will be provided is 0.50. This can also be implemented in the chat communication or in the token revelation communication protocols.
B Sample Instructions
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this group decision making experiment. During the experiment we require your complete, undistracted attention, and ask that you follow instructions carefully.
You should not open other applications on your computer, chat with other students, or engage in other distracting activities, such as using your phone, reading books, etc.
You will be paid for your participation in cash, at the end of the experiment. Different participants may earn different amounts. What you earn depends partly on your decisions, partly on the decisions of others, and partly on chance.
The entire experiment will take place through computer terminals, and all interaction between you will take place through the computers. It is important that you not talk or in any way try to communicate with other participants during the experiment, except as instructed.
We will start with a brief instruction period. During the instruction period, you will be given a complete description of the experiment and will be shown how to use the computers. If you have any questions during the instruction period, raise your hand and your question will be answered out loud so everyone can hear. If you have any questions after the experiment has begun, raise your hand, and an experimenter will come and assist you.
You will make choices over a sequence of 20 matches. In each match, you will be assigned to a group with two other participants in the room. In every match, you and the two other participants you are matched with each makes a single decision. Your earnings for that match will depend on all three group members' decisions, but are completely unaffected by the decisions made by participants assigned to other groups. We will explain exactly how these payoffs are computed in a minute.
At the end of the session, you will be paid the sum of what you have earned in all matches, plus the show-up fee of $ 5. Everyone will be paid in private and you are under no obligation to tell others how much you earned. Your earnings during the experiment are denominated in points. At the end of the experiment you will be paid $ 1 for every 100 points you have earned.
Every match proceeds as follows. At the beginning of each match, we randomly divide you into 3-member groups called committees. The committees are completely independent of each other and payoffs and decisions in one committee have no effect on payoffs and decisions in other committees.
Each member has a single token and can either spend or keep that token. Each member is also assigned a private token value, which is equally likely to be any amount of points between 1 and 100.
Token value assignments are completely independent across members, across committees, and across matches. Thus, your own token value tells you absolutely nothing about the token value of the other members, and has no effect on any future token values that will be assigned to you or anyone else.
Payoffs are computed as follows. If you keep your token you earn your token value in that match plus you earn 100 points if both other members of your committee decide to spend their tokens. If you choose to spend your token, then you earn 100 points if at least one other member of your group spends their token, and you earn 0 points if no other member of your group spends their token. This is summarized in the following table.
Insert Table Here [The following paragraph only in the 'No Communication' treatments.] Every match you are prompted to make your choice to either keep or spend your token. When everyone has made a choice, the outcome and the choices of the other members of your committee are revealed, and this determines your earnings for the match. [The following two paragraphs only in the 'Token Revelation' treatments.] Before anyone makes a spending decision, your committee has a 20 seconds message stage, during which you are allowed to send a message to the other members of your committee. This message can only be an integer between 1 and 100 and you are allowed to send only one such message. The integer value you send are seen by both other members of your committee. In the situation where you do not send any message, it will be shown as a "question mark" to other members of your committee at the end of the message stage.
When the message stage ends, the decision stage begins wherein you are prompted to make your choice to either keep or spend your token. When everyone has made a choice, the outcome and the choices of the other members of your committee are revealed, and this determines your earnings for the match. When the discussion period ends, the decision stage begins wherein you are prompted to make your choice to either keep or spend your token. When everyone has made a choice, the outcome and the choices of the other members of your committee are revealed, and this determines your earnings for the match.
When all committees have finished the first match, we then go to the next match. You will be randomly re-matched into new 3-person committees and everyone is independently and randomly assigned a new token value between 1 and 100. Every match proceeds according to exactly the same rules as described above.
C Additional Tables
The following tables expand the analysis presented in the body of the paper, where applicable, to include data from the early rounds 1-10.
Rounds
No Comm. Binary Comm. Token Revelation Unrestricted Chat * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Table 21 : Decision in the 'Token revelation' treatment: Marginal effects from probit regression with "contribution decision" as the dependant variable. Standard errors, clustered at the subject level, are in parentheses.
